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1Distributed Resource Allocation for Data Center
Networks: A Hierarchical Game Approach
Huaqing Zhang, Yong Xiao, Shengrong Bu, Richard Yu, Dusit Niyato, and Zhu Han
Abstract—The increasing demand of data computing and
storage for cloud-based services motivates the development and
deployment of large-scale data centers. This paper studies the re-
source allocation problem for the data center networking system
when multiple data center operators (DCOs) simultaneously serve
multiple service subscribers (SSs). We formulate a hierarchical
game to analyze this system where the DCOs and the SSs
are regarded as the leaders and followers, respectively. In the
proposed game, each SS selects its serving DCO with preferred
price and purchases the optimal amount of resources for the
SS’s computing requirements. Based on the responses of the
SSs’ and the other DCOs’, the DCOs decide their resource
prices so as to receive the highest profit. When the coordination
among DCOs is weak, we consider all DCOs are noncooperative
with each other, and propose a sub-gradient algorithm for the
DCOs to approach a sub-optimal solution of the game. When
all DCOs are sufficiently coordinated, we formulate a coalition
game among all DCOs and apply Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
as a resource division approach to achieve high utilities. Both
solutions constitute the Stackelberg Equilibrium. The simulation
results verify the performance improvement provided by our
proposed approaches.
Index Terms — Data center, hierarchical game, game
theory, resource management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing attracts significantly interest in recent
years due to the popularity of data services and applications.
To meet the demand for the data-intensive cloud computing
applications, huge investments have been made by companies,
commonly referred to as the data center operators (DCOs) to
build large-scale data centers [1]. Each data center consists of
a large amount of facilities and computing resources, which
can be accessed and shared by multiple service subscribers
(SSs) at the same time. For example, companies such as eBay,
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo [2]–[7] nowadays are
able to provide data computing or data storage services for SSs
with large-scale data centers, which significantly improve the
SSs’ efficiency and convenience.
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Fig. 1: The game structure
As more and more companies join the cloud computing mar-
ket, the competition among different DCOs becomes intense.
How to optimize their services and prices so as to attract more
SSs and maximize the revenues is one critical problem for
DCOs. From the SS’s perspective, different SSs have different
expectations in price, delay, etc., of various cloud computing
services provided by the DCOs. Therefore, how to choose
the optimal DCO that meets its requirements is an important
problem for each SS.
Nevertheless, the existing works didn’t consider any rela-
tionship among multiple DCOs, which motivates the work of
this paper. In this paper, we investigate resource allocation
among multiple competitive or cooperative DCOs, each of
which processes resources that can be accessed by SSs at a
certain price. The main objective of each DCO is to maximize
its profit by adjusting the price offered to the SSs. Since each
SS has its own service requirement and price affordability,
the SS should decide the appropriate DCO and the number
of resource blocks to procure based on the offered price.
Therefore, we formulate a hierarchical game model to analyze
the joint optimization of the decision making processes for
both DCOs and SSs. In this game, all DCOs are the leaders
that decide the prices first, and all SSs are the followers
that can make their decisions based on the prices declared
by the leaders. When the coordination among all DCOs is
weak, we consider all DCOs to be noncooperative with each
other and propose the sub-gradient algorithm for the DCOs to
approach a sub-optimal solution of the game. When all DCOs
are sufficiently coordinated with each other, we formulate a
coalition game among all the DCOs. In order to guarantee
fairness and avoid the competition among all DCOs in the
coalition game, each DCO should obtain revenue proportional
to its capability. Accordingly, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
2is adopted as a resource division approach to achieve fair and
efficient utilities. Based on the above, the contribution of this
paper can be summarized as follows,
 A multi-DCO multi-user scenario with cooperative and
competitive behaviors among DCOs is analysed in the
paper.
 Based on the proposed scenario, a hierarchical game-
based model has been established to analyze the interac-
tion between the DCOs and the SSs. In the hierarchical
game, the interaction between the DCOs and SSs are
modeled as a Stackelberg game, and the cooperation and
competition behaviors among the DCOs are modeled as
a coalition game and non-cooperative game, respectively.
To our best knowledge, it is the first paper to adopt a
hierarchical game model in the data center networks.
 In the scenario where all DCOs are competitive with
each other, a sub-gradient algorithm is adopted to reach
a Stackelberg equilibrium solution where no DCO or
SS can further improve their performance by unilaterally
deviating from their decisions.
 In the scenario where all DCOs are coordinated with each
other, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining is applied to achieve
fair sharing of their utility among all DCOs.
 Simulation results have been presented to verify the
performance improvements of our proposed approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We de-
scribe the system model in Subsection II-A and formulate
the problems in Subsection II-B. According to the formulated
problem, we further analyze the game in Section III and
present simulation results in Section IV. Finally, we show
related works in Section V and summarize our work in Section
VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider a cloud computing system consisting of M
DCOs, labeled as o1; o2; : : : ; oM with different amounts of
computing facilities that can be accessed to and shared by N
SSs, labeled as s1; s2; : : : ; sN . The computing facilities can
be massive data centers built by each DCO or any public
data centers rent and shared by DCOs. We suppose that all
the DCOs offer computing resources over the Internet [34]
to all SSs at the same time. We use the term “computing
resource block” to denote the unit of time and computing
speed measured by service rate that can be allocated to each
SS. Let Si be the total number of computing resource blocks
allocated by DCO oi. We use i to denote the service rate
of each computing resource block of DCO oi. Let j be the
workload arrival rate of sj . Let ij be the workload arrival
rate generated from SS sj , which will be processed using the
resources of DCO oi. We have j =
PM
i=1 ij .
In this paper, we focus on the delay-sensitive applications
in which quality of service (QoS) of each SS is relative with
both the data rate and the total delay during the service. 8i 2
f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, DCO oi charges price pi to each SS for using
one computing resource block. The main objective of each SS
is to choose the DCO that can provide the highest QoS at
TABLE I: List of Notations
Symbol Definition
M Total number of DCOs
N Total number of SSs
Si Number of computing resource blocks for the DCO
oi
i Service rate of computing resource blocks in the
DCO oi
j Workload arrival rate for the SS sj
pi Price per unit of computing resource block of the
DCO oi
pmaxi Maximum service price of the DCO oi
wij Cost of queuing delay of SS sj at DCO oi
d
z1z2:::zN
j Cost of network delay of SS sj when each SS sj
is served by DCO ozj
rij Cost of total delay of SS sj at DCO oi
mij Number of computing resource blocks from DCO
i to SS sj
ei Energy cost of DCO oi
kj Weight factor between the benefits from the work-
load and the total cost of SS sj
c Cost of purchasing one watt power
qi Power requirement of each computing resource
block in DCO oi
ij Probability for SS sj to choose DCO oi
bzjj Motivation of price reduction on one unit of net-
work delay for the SS sj
ui Utility of DCO oi
umaxi Maximum utility of DCO oi
vj Utility of SS sj
rth Upper bound of total delay cost
qij;s Static power requirement when DCO oi serves SS
sj
qij;c Computing power requirement when DCO oi
serves SS sj
xij Speed of computing workloads when DCO oi
serves SS sj
 Pairing outcomes between DCOs and SSs
m Strategies of all SSs
p Prices set by all DCOs
the lowest price. Specifically, the cost incurred by the queuing
delay for each SS sj when served by DCO oi is given by [35],
[36],
wij =
j
i   jmij
; (1)
wheremij is the number of computing resource blocks offered
by DCO oi to SS sj . This work can be easily extended to other
delay models in DCOs.
The cost of total delay can be expressed as the summation
of the delay in data processing by the DCOs plus the delay in
data transmission in the network, i.e.,
rij = wij + d
z1z2:::zN
j ; (2)
where dz1z2:::zNj is the cost of network delay for SS sj when
each DCO ozk serves each SS sk, 8k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng. The
network delay can be affected by the time spent on uploading
the computing data from SS sj to DCO oi, as well as that
spent on a feedback of the computing results from the DCOs
to the SSs. As we can obtain the value of the network delay
by sending training sequence timely, in this paper, we assume
the value of dz1z2:::zNj , 8j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng is known.
Furthermore, we consider resource allocation for each data
center where each DCO needs to take into account its power
3consumption when providing services to SSs. Specifically, we
model the energy cost of each DCO as the total amount of
power required by all the computing resource blocks as follows
[37]:
ei = c
NX
j=1
ijijmij ; (3)
where ij is the energy consumption for each computing
resource block, satisfying,
ij =
(
qij;s + qij;c(xij)
j
xij
; if xij > 0;
0; if xij = 0:
(4)
qij;s is the static power requirement regardless of workloads
as long as the corresponding computing resource block mij
has been used by an SS. qij;c(xij) is the computing power
when the computing resource block mij has been applied to
compute workloads xij . c is the cost of purchasing each unit
of power, and ij is the probability for SS sj to choose DCO
oi, where ij = 1 (or ij = 0) means that SS sj is (or is not)
served by DCO oi.
Accordingly, the profit of DCO oi, 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, is
the total revenue obtained by selling resources to SSs minus
the cost of power consumption, which can be written as
ui(pij;m;p i) =
NX
j=1
ijmijpi  ei; 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg;
(5)
where  = hiji, i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng is
the pairing probability between DCOs and SSs, m = hmiji,
i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng contains the strategies of
all SSs, p i contains the optimal prices set by all other DCOs
except DCO oi, and p = hpii, i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg contains the
prices charged by the DCOs. pi > 0, 8i.
Each SS tries to achieve a high utility from the service while
minimizing both the service delay and payment to DCOs. We
hence can define the utility of SS sj as
vj(mj jm j ;p) = kjj  
MP
i=1
ijmijpi  
MP
i=1
ijrij ;
8j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng;
(6)
where mj is the strategy of purchasing computing resources
from all DCOs for SS sj , m j is the strategy of purchasing
computing resources for all the other SSs, and kj is the
weight factor. Accordingly, the first term kjj represents the
weighted revenues achieved by each SS sj from the services.
The second term
MP
i=1
ijmijpi is the amount of money that
SS sj is required to pay the DCO oi for the service. The
third term
MP
i=1
ijrij is the cost of the total delay in service. If
the delay is large, the user experience of the SSs is poor,
and the corresponding utilities are small. Let rth be the
maximum delay that can be tolerated by SSs. Thus, rij > 0
and rij 6 rth.
B. Problem Formulation
In the cloud computing with multiple DCOs and multiple
SSs, when each DCO sets its price for each computing
resource block, the DCO needs to consider the prices offered
by other DCOs as well as the strategies of all SSs. Therefore,
the optimization problem for each DCO oi is,
max
pi
ui(pij;m;p i); 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg;
s:t: pi > 0;
(7)
where p i is the optimal prices of all other DCOs except the
DCO oi. m is the optimal strategies of all SSs.
Based on the price declared by the DCOs, each SS needs
to compete with other SSs when choosing their optimal
DCO. Each SS also decides the optimal number of computing
resource blocks procured from its chosen DCO. Therefore, we
can define the optimal problem for SS sj as
max
mj
vj(mj jm j ;p); 8j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng;
s:t:

rij > 0;
rij 6 rth;
(8)
We assume that each of the DCOs or SSs is rational and
autonomous when making its decision in a distributed fashion.
To make full use of the resource provided by the DCOs and
meet the computing requirements of all SSs, we model the
scenario as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game.
The DCOs act as the leaders, and the SSs act as the followers.
In the following section, we will discuss and explore the
optimal strategies for each player of the game, based on
different settings and objectives.
III. GAME ANALYSIS
According to the formulated problems in the modeled multi-
leader multi-follower Stackelberg game, the optimal solutions
can be achieved when the Stackelberg Equilibrium can be
achieved between the DCOs and SSs. The concept of Stacekel-
berg Equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Definition 1: [38] Let ((X;A); (g; f)) be the multi-leader
multi-follower Stackelberg game withm leaders and n follow-
ers. X = X1X2 : : :Xm and A = A1A2 : : :An
are the strategy profiles of leaders and followers, respectively.
g = (g1(x); : : : ; gm(x)) is the payoff function of leaders for
x 2 X, and f = (f1(); : : : ; fn()) is the payoff function of
followers for  2 A. Let xi be a strategy profile of leader i,
x i be a strategy profile of all the leaders except leader i, j
be a strategy profile of follower j, and  j be a strategy profile
of all the followers except leader j. A set of strategy profiles
x 2 X and  2 A is the equilibrium of the multi-leader
multi-follower game if 8i;8j, xi 2 Xi;j 2 Aj ,
gi(x

i ;x

 i;
)  gi(xi;x i;)  gi(xi;x i;);
fj(x;

j ;

 j)  fj(x;j ; j):
In following parts of this section, we first consider a
simplified version of our problem and analyze the Stackelberg
Equilibrium for a single-DCO and single-SS cloud computing
4system, in order to analyze the basic relationship between
the DCO and SS. We then extend our model to the case
with multiple DCOs and SSs, and discuss the competition or
coalition among all DCOs.
A. Single-DCO single-SS Stackelberg game
Consider the scenario where there is only one DCO and one
SS in the game, i.e., M = 1 and N = 1. Based on the cost
of the SS, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: In a single-DCO single-SS scenario, for a given
price p1 of the DCO, the optimal number of computing
resource blocks chosen by the SS is given by
m11 =
1
1
p
p1
+
1
1
: (9)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
The optimal strategy for each SS has a closed form solution
under the given price of the DCO, which can be pre-calculated
and pre-stored in a table in the SS. In real scenarios, the SS can
then use a simple table searching method to obtain its optimal
solution with low implementation complexity. Therefore, for
the SS in the game, the computation requirement is very low.
Furthermore, because of the first-move advantage in the
Stackelberg game, the DCO is able to predict the optimal
strategy of the SS. Therefore, we substitute (1) into (5), and
the profit of the DCO can be derived as
u1 =
1
1
p
p1 +
1
1
p1   c11 1
1
p
p1
  c11 1
1
: (10)
The utility of the DCO u1 is a monotonically increasing
function with respective to p1. Furthermore, according to the
constraint that the delay of the SS cannot exceed rth, i.e.,
r11 =
1
1
p
p1 +
1
1
+ 1d
1
1 6 rth: (11)
Thus in the single-DCO single-SS scenario, when the DCO
sets price
pmax1 = (rth   1  1d11)2; (12)
the profit of the DCO is maximized.
In the single-DCO single-SS scenario, the Stackelberg E-
quilibrium can be achieved. Both the DCO and the SS have
their optimal utilities, respectively, and neither of them is able
to change their strategy to achieve higher values.
B. Multi-DCO multi-SS hierarchical game
In a multi-DCO and multi-SS scenario, each SS has multiple
choices on its serving DCOs, and each DCO may also be able
to serve multiple SSs to receive higher profits. Accordingly,
there exists the competition or coordination among DCOs and
SSs. In this section, we analyze and propose strategies for each
SS and DCO so as to receive the optimal utility.
We consider the data center network system with N SSs
which can choose service fromM DCOs. When SS sj chooses
DCO ozj , 8j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng, following the results in the
single-DCO single-SS scenario, each SS makes its decision
on the optimal number of computing resource blocks mzjj ,
where
mzjj =
j
zj
p
pzj
+
j
zj
: (13)
Accordingly, the utility of SS sj is denoted as vz1z2:::zNj , i.e.,
vz1z2:::zNj = kjj  
j
zj
(
p
pzj + 1)
2   jdz1z2:::zNj : (14)
Based on the utility of each SS in different situations,
we assume that each SS sj , 8j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng is able to
determine the probability to be served by each DCO ozj , i.e.,
zjj , 8zj 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg. Therefore, in order to achieve high
utilities with low service price and network delay for each SS
sj , we refer the incentive mechanism method in [39] and set
the probability for each SS sj to choose DCO ozj as
ij =
bzjj
MP
zj=1
bzjj
; (15)
where bzjj is the motivation of price reduction on unit network
delay, i.e.,
bzjj =
(pmaxzj   pzj )
dz1z2:::zNj
: (16)
Following the results of the single-leader single-follower sce-
nario, in order to satisfy the service delay requirements of all
served SSs, the maximum setting price of DCO ozj is
pmaxzj = minf(rth   1  zjdz1z2:::zNj )2g; 8j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng:
(17)
Based on the above, if SS sj experiences small network
delay and relatively small service price compared with its
maximum price constraint pzj  pmaxzj , then the value of
bzjj is small. When the value of bzj0 j0 for other SS sj0 is
relatively small, the probability for SS sj to be served by
the DCO ozj is large. Therefore, in order to attract more
SSs, each DCO oi, 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, is motivated to set
the price maximizing the gap pmaxi   pi for each SS sj ,
8j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng. Compared with the behaviors of other
DCOs o i, if the corresponding value of bij served by DCO
oi is relatively large, then the value of ij is large, and thus
SS sj is more likely to be served by DCO oi. On the other
hand, each DCO needs to keep a high value of pzj to receive
high revenues from the service. Accordingly, there is a tradeoff
for setting prices of DCOs. Considering the behaviors of all
other DCOs, if DCO oi set a high service price for SS sj , the
revenues when SS sj is served by DCO oi is high, but the
probability when SS sj is served by DCO oi is low. On the
other hand, if the DCO set a low service price for SS sj , SS
sj is more likely to choose the service of DCO oi, but the
revenues when SS sj is served by DCO oi are low.
With the prediction of all SSs’ behaviors, each DCO expects
to set its service price so as to receive the optimal utility.
5(a) Utility of DCO o1 with different prices set by DCOs
(b) Utility of DCO o2 with different prices set by DCOs
Fig. 2: Utilities of the DCOs with different pricing behaviors
Therefore, substitute (13) into (5) and the utility of DCO oi
can be denoted as
ui =
NX
j=1
ij

j
i
p
pi +
j
i
pi   cij j
i
p
pi
  cij j
i

:
(18)
In (18), ij is related to the setting price of all DCOs.
Accordingly, in order to obtain high utility, each DCO should
also consider the behaviors of other DCOs. For ease of
demonstration, we take an example of a two-DCO two-SS
scenario and illustrate the relationships of setting prices from
both DCOs in Fig. 2.
With different prices, the utilities of both DCOs are shown
in Fig. 2. When the price of DCO o2 is fixed and DCO
o1 increases its service price, the probability for the SSs to
choose DCO o1 unilaterally decreases, but the utility of DCO
o1 firstly increases and then decreases. Similarly, when the
price of DCO o1 is fixed and DCO o2 increases its service
price, the utility of DCO o2 firstly increases, then decreases.
In order to better analyze the problem, we separate the figures
into three regions.
R1 In the region 1, the price of DCO o2 is relatively high,
while the price of DCO o1 is relatively low. Because
of the large gap in price between both DCOs, even
though DCO o2 with a higher price is able to serve
SSs with a lower delay and better performance, both
SSs still prefer to choose DCO o1, considering the total
cost of the service. Accordingly, in order to serve the
SSs and receive the highest revenues given strategies
of the others, there are tradeoffs for both DCOs when
they set their service prices. For DCO o2, setting a high
price allows it to receive high payment from serving
the SSs. However, it should avoid setting a price far
higher than that of DCO o1. Otherwise, the probabilities
for the SSs to choose DCO o2 are low, and DCO o2
cannot gain high revenues. For DCO o1, setting low
prices may help it serve more SSs, and receive more
revenues. Nevertheless, as the service price is low, even
though the amount of payment from SSs to DCO o1 is
large, DCO o1 can only achieve limited revenue from
a single SS. In general, the DCO may not receive high
revenues.
R2 The price set by both DCOs at each point in this region
is competitive. Accordingly, neither of the DCOs is able
to be chosen by both SSs, and each DCO will serve
one SS at the same time. In this situation, as the prices
of both DCOs are competitive and each DCO needs to
predict the behavior of the other DCO, and to set their
serving prices optimally. On one hand, if the DCO is
setting a price that is too high, its served SS will leave
the service, resulting in a low revenue for the DCO. On
the other hand, if the DCO sets a low price for its served
SS, although the SS stays, the revenue of serving the SS
is not maximized.
R3 In region 3, the price of DCO o1 is relatively high, while
the price of DCO o2 is relatively low. With the same
reason as in the case of region 1, even though DCO
o1 with a higher price is able to serve the SSs with
a lower delay and better performance, both SSs still
prefer to choose DCO o2, considering the total costs of
the service. Therefore, on one hand, with prediction and
estimation of the prices from DCO o2, DCO o1 should
avoid setting the price that is too high falling into the
region 3. On the other hand, DCO o2 should compare
and evaluate the total revenues, balancing the expected
number of served SSs and setting a price.
Therefore, when setting the price for the SSs, there is the
competition between DCO o1 and DCO o2. Either DCO should
estimate the behavior of the others, balance the setting price
and number of the expected SSs and make decisions so as to
achieve high revenues. In the general situation with M DCOs
and N SSs, the figures become M +1 dimensions, which can
be separated into M + 1 regions. In each region, the tradeoff
among DCOs’ decisions works in a similar way.
However, for each DCO in the game, it is hard to predict the
behaviors of other DCOs, causing unstable and unsatisfying
results for each other. In the following sections, based on the
different benefits of the SSs and DCOs, we propose both the
competitive and the coordinated strategies for the DCOs to
achieve the highest utility given the actions of other DCOs.
In the real situations where some DCOs coordinate with some
other DCOs, and some still compete with other DCOs, the
DCOs that can cooperate with each other will coordinated
6with each other first. Then, each coordinated DCOs can be
regarded as a coalition and compete with other DCOs outside
of the coalition using the competitive algorithm.
1) The competitive behavior among DCOs: In the nonco-
operative scenario where each DCO only considers its own
revenue, in order to regulate the behaviors of the DCOs and
obtain a stable and optimal solution, we propose a sub-gradient
algorithm for DCOs of the game.
When DCOs adopt the sub-gradient algorithm, each DCO
initially assumes that there is no competition with other DCOs
and sets its service price at the maximum value to receive
high utility. When the DCO discovers that there exist other
DCOs trying to attract SSs with lower prices, the DCO predicts
the reactions of the other DCOs on its own price and the
tradeoff on its pricing strategy should be considered. If the
DCO decreases its service price and competes with other
DCOs, SSs are more likely to be served by the DCO. Thus, the
expected number of served SSs increases. However, because of
the low service price, the revenue the DCO obtain from each
SS decreases. Similarly, when the DCO increases its service
price, even though the DCO receives higher revenues from
each served SS, as other DCOs serve SSs with lower prices
and good performance, the number of SSs choosing the DCO
decreases. Accordingly, in order to make optimal decisions
based on the prediction other DCOs’ strategies, we propose
an iterated process for the DCOs to adjust their behaviors
so as to receive optimal utilities. At each iteration, the DCO
tries to increase or decrease its price with a small step and
predict the resulting utility, if the adjustment increases its
utility, the DCO will increase or decrease its price in the next
iteration. Otherwise, the DCO will keep the current service
price unchanged. Within finite number of iterations, all DCOs
are able to determine the best decisions with the highest
utilities. We assume that p = hpii is the pricing profile of all
DCOs in the previous iteration, pold = hpoldii is the pricing
profile of all DCOs in the previous iteration, and pold i is the
pricing profile of all DCOs except DCO oi in the previous
iteration. Accordingly, the detailed algorithm is shown as in
Algorithm 1. Then, the following Lemma 2 holds for the
proposed algorithm.
Lemma 2: When the starting price and step size of DCO oi
i, 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg are fixed, the game can always con-
verge to a unique outcome, which is also the Nash equilibrium
of the game.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
For the proposed sub-gradient algorithm, it is not necessary
for all the players to be strictly synchronized when they
make decisions. More specifically, for each SS, based on the
observation of the announced prices from all DCOs, each SS
determines the optimal amount of computing resource block
to purchase. In this case, all the SSs do not have to make
decisions at the exactly same time. For each DCO, based on
the observation of the announced prices of other DCOs and the
observation of current behaviors of all SSs, it is able to follow
our proposed algorithm to set its price to improve its utility. In
Algorithm 1 Strategy of each DCO in a multi-DCO multi-SS
scenario.
1: Initially, each DCO ignores the existence of other DCOs,
and sets its price at the maximum value to receive the
highest revenue from all SSs.
2: while at least one DCO adjusts its price do
3: for SS sj do
4: Based on the prices set by all DCOs, each SS
determines the probability to be served by each DCO
and purchases the optimal amount of resource blocks
from each DCO.
5: end for
6: for DCO oi do
7: Each DCO stores the current value of service prices.
pold = p;
8: Each DCO adjusts its price with a small step i and
calculate its own payoff based on the prediction of
the followers’ optimal strategies.
9: if ui(poldi ;pold i)  ui(poldi +i;pold i) then
10: pi = minfpmaxi ; poldi +ig; % Increase the price
11: else
12: if ui(poldi ;pold i)  ui(poldi  i;pold i) then
13: pi = maxf0; poldi  ig; % Reduce the price
14: else
15: pi = poldi ; % Keep the price unchanged
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
other words, all the DCOs also do not need to make decisions
at the same time, and the algorithm can still converge to the
same Stackelberg equilibrium.
Based on the results of the iterated approaches, the comput-
ing resource blocks are allocated afterwards. Therefore, the
utilities or revenues received by all DCOs and SSs follow
the results of the iterated approaches. After one period, all
the DCOs will perform the sub-gradient algorithm and do the
resource allocation again. Therefore, for the iterative approach
ahead of one period, the resulting Nash Equilibrium is still an
equilibrium solution for a static game, not dynamic one.
2) Coalition formation in DCOs: Even though all DCOs
are able to achieve Nash equilibrium outcomes with the
proposed sub-gradient algorithm, the revenue of each DCO
is still low due to the competition with all other DCOs. To
improve their benefits, DCOs may seek to cooperate with
each other and jointly decide the price offered to the SSs.
Accordingly, in the upper layer of multi-leader multi-follower
hierarchical game, we propose the coalition game among all
DCOs, in order to improve the utilities of the DCOs. However,
some DCOs may be unwilling to cooperate with each other
because of the unfair results within the coalition. We evaluate
the capability of served SSs for each DCO as the revenue
that the DCO receives when all the other DCOs stop serving
SSs. Therefore, in order to guarantee fairness and avoid the
competition among all DCOs in the coalition game, each DCO
7should set its price in the feasible region and obtain revenue
proportional to its capability. In order to achieve the fair
results and high revenues for all DCOs in the coalition game,
we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining as a resource
division approach within all DCOs.
Definition 2: [41] [42] We denote U = [u1; u2; : : : ; uM ]>
as the feasible utility set, and let h = [h1; h2; : : : ; hM ]> be the
disagreement point set, which are the expectations of operators
by joining the game without cooperation. Y = F (U;h) is
regarded as a Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution if the
following six axioms, i.e., individual rationality, feasibility,
pareto optimality, individual monotonicity, independence of
linear transformations, and symmetry, are satisfied.
According to the conclusions of [43] and [44], u =
[u1; u

2; : : : ; u

M ]
> can be a unique solution satisfying all
axioms in Definition 2, if the solution meets the following
condition
u1   h1
umax1   h1
=
u2   h2
umax2   h2
= : : : =
uM   hM
umaxM   hM
; (19)
where umaxi , 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, is the maximum utility of
DCO oi when all SSs are served by the DCO oi with the
highest price pmaxi , i.e.,
umaxi =
NX
j=1
umaxij ; (20)
where
umaxij =
 
j
i
p
pmaxi +
j
i
pmaxi   cij
j
i
p
pmaxi
  cij j
i
!
:
(21)
When all DCOs are noncooperative, the DCOs compete
with each other by reducing their prices. Accordingly, we
suppose that in the competition, the corresponding utility of
each DCO oi is zero, i.e., hi = 0, 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg [42].
Based on the utilities of DCOs, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 3: For each DCO oi in the coalition formation,
8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, when all DCOs adopt Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining as a resource division approach, the setting price
of the DCO oi satisfies
pi = (p
max
i )
 
; (22)
where ()  approaches the limit from the negative side. Cor-
respondingly, the utility of each DCO oi, 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg
is
ui =
NX
j=1
1
N
umaxij ; (23)
where
umaxij =
j
i
p
pmaxi +
j
i
pmaxi   cij
j
i
p
pmaxi
  cij j
i
:
(24)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present the simulations to evaluate the
performances of the proposed approaches with MATLAB.
Without loss of generality, we follow the settings in [36] and
assume that there are two DCOs accessible to three SSs at
the same time. We set the service rate of each computing
resource block in both DCOs as 0:3 (ms) 1. The workload
arrival rates for SS s1, SS s2 and SS s3 are 0:7 (ms) 1, 0:6
(ms) 1, and 0:6 (ms) 1, respectively. We model the distance
between source and data center, divided by the transmission
speed of 200km=ms, resulting in delay ranging in [0; 8] ms,
and the delay tolerance of all SSs is set to 8 ms. The above
settings are reasonable for the existing data center networks.
[36] In the proposed sub-gradient method, we assume that the
price step sizes for both DCOs are 0:01 dollar.
In Fig. 3, we compare our proposed sub-gradient algorithm
with the ordinary noncooperative behavior where each DCO
sets its optimal price based on the observation of other
DCOs’ behaviors in the previous iteration. The noncooperative
behavior cannot guarantee the convergence of the game. In
the simulation, we performed 1000 iterations and took the
average of 10 latest results as an expected social welfare
value. Moreover, we compare the proposed algorithm with the
cooperative behavior, where each DCO can increase its served
price regardless of the number of served SSs. Accordingly,
in order to achieve the high utilities for all DCOs, each
DCO sets its price as the maximum possible value. In our
proposed Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining method, both DCOs
form a coalition with each other based on the bargaining
strategy to achieve fair revenues. The social welfare achieved
by the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining follows the results of
cooperative behaviors. As shown in Fig. 3, with the increased
delay tolerance rth of SSs, all DCOs are able to set a high
price to meet the service requirements of the SSs, and the
performance of the SSs deteriorates. Therefore, the social
welfare generally reduces with rth increasing. Furthermore,
at each value of rth, the social welfare is always higher than
the expected social welfare of the noncooperative strategy
when the DCOs adopt the proposed sub-gradient algorithm.
The social welfare when both DCOs are cooperative is the
lowest, because when the DCOs cooperate with each other,
even though the DCOs receive high revenues, all SSs suffer
more because of the high service price and low quality of
service. Based on the above results, from the perspective of
SSs or the management of data center services, in order to
achieve high social welfare, both DCOs should compete with
each other, and the proposed sub-gradient algorithm is a good
tool to achieve stable and high revenues.
From the perspective of DCOs, the situation is different.
In Fig. 4, we compare the utility of each DCO in coalition
formation with Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining, noncooperative
scenario with sub-gradient algorithm, ordinary noncooperative
behavior, and the situation where only DCO o1 or DCO o2
monopolizes the market. As shown in Fig. 4, we discover that
when the DCOs form a coalition and adopt Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining, the utilities of both DCOs are higher than the util-
ities when DCOs employ the proposed sub-gradient strategy
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Fig. 4: The utility of each DCO with different approaches
or take the noncooperative behaviors. As both DCOs form
a coalition, they do not need to compete with each other
in order to achieve high revenues. They set their prices at
high values to increase the total utilities for the DCOs so
as to obtain high utilities through bargaining. The utilities of
both DCOs when adopting the proposed sub-gradient strategy
are also higher than the utilities in noncooperative behaviors.
Furthermore, we discover in the single DCO situation, where
all SSs have no choice on their serving DCOs, the DCO
is able to receive higher utility than that when there are
multiple DCOs. However, compared with the proposed Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining strategy, it is hard to coordinate one
DCO to give up all its services to the other DCO if only one
DCO serves the SSs, and the quality of service of SSs is lower.
In Fig. 5, we evaluate the impact of the step size in the
proposed sub-gradient strategy. In the simulation, we fix the
step size of DCO o2 as 0:01, and change the step size of
DCO o1 to 0:005, 0:01, 0:015, 0:02, respectively. According
to the algorithm of the proposed sub-gradient strategy, with
a different step size of DCO o1, both DCOs compete with
each other and gradually reduce their prices in the game. The
game finally converges to the similar results, within different
range to the same sub-optimal point of the game. Furthermore,
when the step size increases, with the same starting point, the
convergence speed of the corresponding DCO is faster, but
the range of the sub-optimal point increases. As the starting
price of the proposed sub-gradient strategy is the maximum
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Fig. 5: The converge route in the proposed sub-gradient
strategy with different steps
possible value of each DCO, we discover that when the step
size increases, the service price of the DCO after convergence
is higher, causing a lower utility for its served SSs. Therefore,
there is a tradeoff for the SSs’ choices. When the step size
is large, the convergence time of service is small, but the gap
between the optimal value and achieved value is large. When
the step size is small, the gap between the achieving value
and the optimal value is small, but the delay is large because
of the slow convergence time with sub-gradient algorithm.
Accordingly, if the SSs is more sensitive to the time delay
of the service, it may require fast convergence of the DCO’s
strategies. However, the DCO may be able to set higher prices
for the SSs for higher utilities. On the other hand, if the SSs
expect lower prices from the DCO, the SSs may prefer a small
step size of the DCO and tolerate higher convergence time in
order to purchase the services with optimal prices.
In Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we evaluate the impacts of the workload
requirements of SSs and the service rates of both DCOs,
respectively, for the proposed sub-gradient strategy. As shown
in Fig. 6, without loss of generality and for better presentation,
we fix the workload requirements of SS s3 as 0:6 Mbps and
consider the utility of DCO o1 with different workload values
of SSs s1 and s2. When we consider the same workload value
of SS s1 (or s2) and increase the workload value of SS s2
(or s1), DCO o1 is able to serve SS s2 (or s1) with more
computing resources, so the utility of DCO o1 increases, even
though there is the competition between the DCOs. In Fig. 7,
we consider the performance of SS s1 with different service
rate of both DCOs. When the service rates of both DCOs are
small, even though the delay of the service is large for SS
s1, both DCOs set low prices for the service, and the utility
of SS s1 reaches the maximum value. However, when both
DCOs increase their service rate simultaneously, the DCOs
set higher prices for the service of SS s1. Accordingly, the
utility of SS s1 decreases. Moreover, when DCO o1 (or DCO
o2) has a low service rate, but DCO o2 (or DCO o1) improves
its service rate, the utility of SS s1 first increases and then
decreases. Because when the service rate of DCO o1 (or DCO
o2) is low, its price is set at a low value. When DCO o2 (or
DCO o1) improves its service rate, because of the competition
of both DCOs, the utility of SS s1 first increases because of
the low price and high quality of service. However, when DCO
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o2 (or DCO o1) continues to improve its service rate, DCO
o1 (or DCO o2) also increases its price to receive high utility.
Therefore, the utility of SS s1 decreases.
V. RELATED WORKS
The resource allocation problem has been widely studied for
data center networking systems. [8] performed a comprehen-
sive analysis of energy efficiency in a general infrastructure
supporting the cloud computing paradigm. The authors first
defined a systematic approach for analysis, then utilized the
approach to analyze data centers and finally extracted existing
challenges and future works. In [9], the authors overviewed
data center networks for cloud computing and evaluate con-
struction prototypes for future works in order to improve the
agility for multi-tenant demands in the cloud, responsiveness
and scalability.
Specifically, in [10], the authors studied various problems
for large-scale data centers including task assignment, data
placement, and data movements. An optimization algorithm
that could minimize the total cost during the big data comput-
ing services was proposed. To ensure all users to efficiently
and securely share the network resources, authors in [11]
evaluated the performance of several popular network sharing
policies, such as SecondNet [12], Oktopus [13], Gatekeeper
[14], Seawall [15], NetShare [16], and FairCloud [17], in a
data center with multiple users. In [18], the authors showed
a class of data center network structures based on hypergraph
theory and combinatorial block design theory. Compared with
the classic fat-tree model, the new structures of constructing
large data center networks are more flexible and scalable.
In [19], the authors made comprehensive comparison study
for typical data center networks with regard to their Network
Power Effectiveness (NPE). The results showed that Flattened
Butterfly [20] network topology achieved high NPE in most
of the cases, and the NPE of the server-centric architectures
was usually higher than the NPEs of Fat-Tree [21] and VL2
[22] architectures.
In order to reduce the power consumption of network
elements, the authors in [23] designed a two-level, pod-level,
and core-level power optimization model, namely, Hierarchical
EneRgy Optimization (HERO). The HERO optimized the
way of shutting down network switches and links while
guaranteeing full connectivity and maximizing link utilization
of the network. A novel framework was proposed in [24],
where high energy efficiency could be achieved by assigning
virtual machines to servers and reducing the number of active
switches and balance traffic flows. In order to achieve high
energy efficiency, the authors in [25], took advantage of the
application characteristics and topology features and proposed
TE-VMA and TER algorithms to assign virtual machines and
routing traffic flows, respectively. In [26], a novel architecture
of Cloud-integrated Cyber-Physical System was proposed and
the enabling technologies for Complex Industrial Applications
(CIA) was outlined. The paper provided solutions for the
virtualized resource management techniques, the scheduling of
cloud resources and life cycle management from the perspec-
tive of CIA. In [27], the authors focused on the performance-
guaranteed energy-saving schemes. Based on the constraint
that the transmission of every flow has to be accomplished
before a rigorous deadline, the authors explored the most
energy efficient way of scheduling and routing flows on
the network, as well as determining the transmission speed
for every flow. [28] explored the benefit of electricity price
variations across time and locations for the data centers.
The authors proposed a GreFar algorithm to optimizes the
energy cost and fairness among different organizations subject
to queueing delay and maximum server inlet temperature
constraints. In [29], the authors considered a QoS-constrained
resource allocation problem with game theory. In the game,
each participant first solved its optimization problem with
binary integer programming. Then an evolutionary mechanism
was designed to consider the relationships of different partici-
pants and minimize their efficiency losses. In [30], the authors
considered the adaptive and stable application deployment
in clouds with a multi-objective evolutionary game-theoretic
framework. In the proposed framework, resource allocation
strategy to applications was analyzed based on the location
and the operational conditions in a cloud.
In [31], the authors considered the efficiency of water usage,
and optimized a framework for the workload management of
data centers. In order to design a new, upgraded and expanded
data center network, the authors in [32] proposed a data
center network design framework. By searching the space
of all networks that are feasible under a user-specified data
center model, the proposed framework maximized bisection
bandwidth and minimized end-to-end latency of the designed
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network. In [33], the authors analyzed the management prob-
lem of data centers with multiple layers or heterogeneous
devices. A new simulation tool, called Data Center Simulator
with small scale operating system and storage, was proposed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have studied the resource allocation
problem when multiple data center operators (DCOs) and
service subscribers (SSs) coexist in the networks. In order to
analyze the relationships among multiple DCOs and SSs, we
have modeled the scenario as a multi-leader multi-follower
hierarchical game, where the DCOs act as leaders and the SSs
act as followers. With the prediction of behaviors of all SSs
and reactions of other DCOs, we have discussed the utilities
of the DCOs in different situations and proposed the sub-
gradient algorithm in the noncooperative game and coalition
game with Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining strategies to gain
the benefits in terms of social welfare and the utilities of the
DCOs, respectively. Simulation results have demonstrated that
for the benefits of SSs, all DCOs compete with each other and
all DCOs adopt the proposed sub-gradient strategies to achieve
high social welfare of the game. On the other hand, for the
benefits of DCOs, DCOs form a coalition and perform Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining behaviors so as to achieve high and
fair revenues. The game analysis of the relationship between
DCOs and SSs provides an outlook for the future work in the
multi-DCO multi-SS scenarios. Future work is in progress to
consider the resource allocation problem including both the
massive and edge data center networks.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: As the cost of the SS is continuous, we take the
second derivative of v1 with respect to m11,
@2v1
@m211
=   2
2
11
(1m11   1)3
: (25)
Since the second derivative of v1 with respect to m11 is less
than zero, v1 is a concave function of m11. By setting the first
derivative of v1 with respect to m11 as zero, i.e.,
@v1
@m11
=

1
1m11   1
2
  p1 = 0; (26)
we can obtain the optimal strategy for the SS, which is given
by,
m11 =
1
1
p
p1
+
1
1
: (27)
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: The convergence of the sub-gradient algorithm has
been proved in [45] and [46].
According to [45] and [46], the sub-gradient algorithm is
able to achieve a sub-optimal solution with small ranges.
Therefore, with a given moving step size, each DCO is unable
to unilaterally adjust its price in order to receive higher utility
when the sub-gradient algorithm converges to a sub-optimal
solution.
Furthermore, when the starting price and step size i, 8i 2
f1; 2; : : : ;Mg are fixed, the results in the second iteration are
fixed. According to the mathematical induction, we suppose
that at the Qth iteration, the prices of both DCOs are fixed.
Then in the (Q+1)th iteration, according to the proposed sub-
gradient algorithm, the step size is fixed and the direction from
the current iteration to the next iteration is unique. Therefore,
the prices of both DCOs in the (Q + 1)th iteration are also
fixed. Therefore, based on the above, the game can converge
to a unique outcome, when the starting price and step size i,
8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg are fixed.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: According to the definition of Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining, the optimal prices for DCOs
p = [p1; p2; : : : ; pM ]> satisfy
p = argmax u1
s:t:
u1
umax1
=
u2
umax2
= : : : =
uM
umaxM
:
(28)
When the prices offered by the DCOs satisfy
pi = (p
max
i )
 
; (29)
the corresponding utility of each DCO oi, 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg,
is
ui =
NX
j=1
1
N
umaxij ; (30)
where
umaxij =
j
i
p
pmaxi +
j
i
pmaxi   cij
j
i
p
pmaxi
  cij j
i
:
(31)
Furthermore, as the maximum utility of each DCO oi, 8i 2
f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, equals
umaxi =
NX
j=1
umaxij ; (32)
where
umaxij =
 
j
i
p
pmaxi +
j
i
pmaxi   cij
j
i
p
pmaxi
  cij j
i
!
:
(33)
We discover
u1
umax1
=
u2
umax2
= : : : =
uM
umaxM
=
1
N
: (34)
According to the utility function of each DCO oi, 8i 2
f1; 2; : : : ;Mg, ui is monotonically increasing with the im-
provement of pi. Therefore, when pi approaches its maximum
value, the corresponding utility of DCO oi can also achieve
the highest value. The highest utility of DCO oi follows the
constraint in (28). Accordingly, when the price of DCO oi is
11
pi = (p
max
i )
 
; (35)
the utility of each DCO oi, 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg achieves
ui =
NX
j=1
1
N
umaxij : (36)
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